Does using earnings management to meet or beat analysts' forecasts decrease the market reward to achieving this target? We use changes in effective tax rates from the third to the fourth quarter to estimate managed earnings, following and extending Dhaliwal, Gleason and Mills (2004) . We demonstrate that the market discounts the reward to meeting or beating forecasts by an economically significant amount when the company achieves the target through earnings management, using a decrease in tax expense. Our findings are consistent with firms using earnings management to avoid the market punishment of missing the forecast, but failing to capture the full market reward for meeting the target without management. Our results are robust to including an estimate of abnormal accruals and suggest that identifying firms that manage tax expense contributes incrementally in understanding the market response to meeting or beating earnings.
Introduction
Does using earnings management to meet or beat analysts' forecasts decrease the market reward to achieving this target? Prior evidence using accruals does not provide a clear answer so we investigate the question using income tax expense. This account has attractive, generalizable features because tax expense is substantial for all firms and because, as explained later, the large complex multinational corporations that represent most of the stock capitalization in the U.S.
have discretion in estimating this account. We view our study as less related to tax management as being a study of market response to firms meeting targets through means that could be interpreted as earnings management. We demonstrate that the market discounts the reward to meeting or beating forecasts by an economically significant amount when the company achieves the target through earnings management, using a decrease in tax expense.
Recent research (Brown, 2001; Matsumoto, 2002; Brown and Caylor, 2005) has documented an increase in the tendency of firms to meet or beat analyst estimates. Researchers have generally found significantly higher size-adjusted returns for firms that beat analysts' forecasts than for firms that miss forecasts (Defond and Park, 2001; Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn, 2002; Kasznik and McNichols, 2002; and Bhojraj, Hribar, and Picconi, 2003) . 1 The market reward for beating forecasts provides an incentive for firms to manage earnings to meet or beat the forecast. One implication of the kinked distribution around zero earnings surprise (Burgstahler and Eames, 2003) is the prevalence of earnings management related to beating targets.
2 However, the evidence is mixed regarding whether the positive 1 Complementing research about market rewards for beating expectations, Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn (2002) and Kasznik and McNichols (2002) show that the market reward for meeting or beating expectations appears to be warranted by these firms' subsequent performance. 2 Burgstahler and Eames (2003) find a kink in the distribution of earnings surprises, consistent with fewer firms than expected missing earnings expectations by a cent and more firms than expected just meeting or beating expectations by a cent. Beaver, McNichols and Nelson (2003) examine the kink around zero earnings and attribute some of it to market response to beating expectations differs according to whether firms use earnings management to beat the forecast. Defond and Park (2001) show that the market reward to beating forecasts is lower for firms with income increasing abnormal accruals than for firms with income decreasing abnormal accruals. Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn (2002) find a significant, but "economically minor" (198) discount of the market reward for firms where the amount of abnormal accruals was needed for the firm to meet or beat expectations. However, in a narrow sample of firms that beat or missed the forecast by only one cent, Bhojraj, Hribar and Picconi (2003) find no evidence of a different announcement period market response to beating the forecast for firms with high levels of accruals or other measures of low earnings quality. Thus, there is not yet conclusive evidence that the market reacts differently to managed versus unmanaged earnings. Bartov, Givoly and Hayn (2002) suggest one reason for the small discount on the reward to beating targets when the firm managed earnings could be the power of the methodology to detect management. 3 Healy and Wahlen (1999) suggest that a direction for future research on earnings management is to focus on the accounts where earnings management occurs. We focus on the income tax expense and measure earnings management using changes from the third to the fourth quarter effective tax rate (ETR).
4 lower effective tax rates for loss firms and special items. We examine profitable firms around zero earnings surprise. In addition, our results are robust to removing firms with special items. 3 They suggest a second reason is that the announcement period may not identify the time period where investors assess the degree of earnings management. Balsam, Bartov, and Marquardt (2002) and Bhojraj, Hribar, and Picconi (2003) examine the subsequent market response to high levels of accruals. They find corrections around the 10-Q filing date or over the subsequent two years, respectively, indicating that the market eventually recognizes the extent to which earnings management contributed to meeting the forecast. We examine both the announcement period, which includes information about the ETR, and the year following the earnings announcement. 4 Other studies have documented earnings management in specific accounts including: total income tax expense (Dhaliwal, Gleason, and Mills 2004) , restructuring charges (Moehrle 2002), valuation allowance for deferred tax asset (Schrand and Wong 2003) , and permanently reinvested earnings (Krull 2004) Dhaliwal Gleason and Mills (2004) find that firms that would otherwise miss analysts' targets in the fourth quarter lower their ETRs so that the decrease in income tax expense permits them to beat the target. 5 They assert that tax expense provides a "last chance" for fine degrees of earnings management, because the tax expense is one of the last accounts reviewed in the yearend audit. Tax expense components such as the provision for tax contingencies (tax cushion), valuation allowances, and foreign tax rate effects are complex and require management judgment for estimation. Management can use its discretion in making these estimates to manage earnings.
APB Opinion No. 28 requires a firm to "make its best estimate of the effective tax rate expected to be applicable for the full fiscal year. The rate so determined should be used in providing for income taxes on income for the quarter." By the time the third quarter earnings are released, the corporation should be able to anticipate most tax planning that can take effect by year-end. 6 Because the third quarter estimate of the annual ETR is better-informed than estimates from quarters one and two, we use the fourth quarter change for our tests. We use the third quarter ETR as our benchmark for "unmanaged" ETR. We determine whether the decrease in tax expense is necessary to meet or beat the forecast by determining whether net income before the decrease would meet or beat the forecast. We measure net income before the decrease as actual year-end pretax earnings less income tax computed using the third-quarter ETR.
Because our measure holds reported pretax income constant, we can refer to the effect both as a tax expense change and as an effective tax rate change.
5 Inferring earnings management from the third-to-fourth quarter decreases in the ETR is consistent with concurrent evidence that late-year changes are not as persistent or value relevant as changes early in the year. Schmidt (2005) finds that tax expense changes due to first quarter decreases in the ETR are more persistent than changes from quarters two through four. Guenther and Jones (2003) find that fourth quarter changes in ETRs are less value relevant in explaining annual market-adjusted returns than are changes occurring in the first three quarters. These papers address more specifically the evidence in Lipe (1986), Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) and Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) that included effective tax rates as one component in the value relevance of earnings. 6 For example, extreme tax planning transactions such as inverting the corporate legal entity to a tax haven require several months to plan and obtain board approval. See Cloyd, Mills and Weaver (2003) .
We are interested in the market reaction to beating the forecast by decreasing income tax expense. The market can observe a change in effective tax rate at the time of the annual earnings announcement, but cannot easily disentangle whether the change represents earnings management, other than the prima facia result that the firm would have missed the target absent such change. This suggests that the circumstances surrounding the change in the ETR are as or more important than the change itself in determining the market response.
Illustrating the importance of the meet or beat effect of the decrease in tax expense, Texas Our hypothesis predicts that the market response to meeting or beating the forecast only after decreasing tax expense will be lower than for firms that beat the forecast regardless of any change in tax expense if the decrease is perceived as earnings management, consistent with Defond and Park (2001) and Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn (2002) .
An alternative to our hypothesis is that earnings management takes longer for market participants to assess (Balsam, Bartov and Marquardt 2002 and Bhojraj, Hribar and Picconi 2003) . Further, market participants may not view tax changes as earnings management, or they may conclude that earnings management is beneficial to shareholders (Arya, Glover and Sunder 2003) . The market could also discount tax decreases in general. We examine this alternative and find that the discount is concentrated in firms that need the tax expense decrease to meet or beat the target.
We compute the cumulative size-adjusted returns around the announcement window and over the year after the announcement. We find a smaller positive announcement window reaction for firms that beat the forecast only after decreasing tax expense than for firms that beat the forecast regardless of any change in tax expense. The market discount is approximately 40 percent of the reward for firms that beat the forecast regardless of changes in tax expense. This reaction is consistent with the market treating the decrease in tax rate as earnings management and discounting the reward for beating the forecast through earnings management. Both reactions are more positive than the reaction for firms that miss the forecast, indicating that managing earnings to beat the forecast is still better than missing the forecast. Our results are robust to including abnormal accruals as a control for pre-tax earnings management that may have already taken place.
We further partition firms that beat the forecast regardless of changes in tax expense based on whether firms increased or decreased the tax expense. We find that firms that need the decrease in tax expense to beat the forecast continue to have a less positive market return than do firms that decreased tax expense but did not need the decrease to beat the forecast. The discount is approximately 25 percent. Thus, we conclude that our results are not simply a discount to decreases in tax expense.
We also find that including indicator variables for whether and how firms beat the forecast subsumes much of the information in the forecast error. In the year following the earnings announcement, beating the forecast regardless of changes in tax expense is associated with positive and significantly greater abnormal returns than beating the forecast by decreasing tax expense. The market appears to take longer than the announcement period to recognize the difference in how the two groups of firms meet or beat the forecast.
When we limit the sample to firms within five cents of the target, we find generally similar results around the announcement window and in the year following the earnings announcement. In contrast to Bhojrarj, Hribar and Picconi (2003) , our strong announcement window results close to the target suggest that tax expense changes are a more visible form of earnings management than are total accruals.
We contribute to research by Bartov, Givoly and Hayn (2002) and Bhojraj, Hribar and Picconi (2003) that investigates the market response to earnings management implied by accruals. We extend and complement this literature by examining whether the market response to beating the forecast differs according to whether the firm appears to have managed a specific account, tax expense, to beat forecasts. Our results are robust to including an estimate of abnormal accruals and suggest that identifying firms that manage tax expense contributes incrementally in understanding the market response to meeting or beating earnings. Our finding that the market rewards beating forecasts using tax-related earnings management, but not as much as beating the forecast absent tax management, suggests that managers that used tax departments as a profit center for earnings management in the 1990s avoided the market punishment of missing the forecast, but didn't capture the full market reward for meeting the target without management.
Literature and hypothesis development
Our primary research question is whether the market reacts differently to earnings that appear to be managed. Prior research has examined whether the market reacts differently to firms that manage earnings to meet or beat the target. However, there is mixed evidence on whether the reaction is different. Defond and Park (2001) find lower returns for firms with positive earnings surprises and income increasing abnormal accruals than for firms with income decreasing abnormal accruals. However, the response is incomplete and the prices continue to drift over the subsequent 80 trading days. Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn (2002) find a lower return over the quarter preceding the earnings announcement for firms where the amount of abnormal accruals was needed for the firm to meet or beat expectations. However, they note that this lower return represents an economically minor discount. Thus, study of alternative measures of earnings management provides further insight on the magnitude of the discount for managed earnings.
In contrast, over a five-day window around annual earnings announcements, Bhojraj, Hribar and Picconi (2003) , focusing on firms that beat or miss earnings by one cent, find no difference in the market response to the earnings announcement of firms that beat the forecast by one cent and have higher accruals, versus firms that beat the forecast by one cent and have lower accruals. Their results are similar for firms with high and low earnings quality, measured as a combination of the level of accruals and spending on R&D and advertising. However, firms with low accruals (or high earnings quality) have significantly higher returns over the subsequent two years. Because these firms were one cent above the target, it seems reasonable to assume that the high accruals permitted these firms to beat the target. Thus, this finding contrasts with Bartov, Givoly and Hayn (2002) .
An alternative to using total accruals or discretionary accruals as a measure of earnings management is to focus on specific income statement accounts. We focus on tax expense management. Several recent papers assert that tax expense is used for earnings management. 7 Dhaliwal, Gleason and Mills (2004) present evidence that changes in total tax expense from the third to the fourth quarter are used to meet analysts' annual earnings forecasts. They argue that the total tax expense permits discretionary earnings management because it requires judgment to estimate and there is information asymmetry, both between financial statement users and managers, and even between auditors and managers.
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Estimating tax expense involves judgment in several ways. First, the amount of permanent differences, credits and jurisdictional rate differences that affect the effective tax rate are often difficult to estimate prior to the earnings release date. Second, corporate tax shelters were perceived to be increasing in use during our sample period (U.S. Treasury, 1999) , and the ideal tax shelter would be a transaction that reduces taxable income without decreasing book income, generating an effective tax rate benefit (McGill and Outslay, 2004) . Determining how much of a permanent rate benefit to record, and how much to provide a cushion for, is a matter of discretion. Under SFAS No. 5, corporations must record probable and estimable liabilities (cushion) for ongoing or expected IRS audits that challenge credits, permanent differences, or the jurisdiction in which income is reported. 9 Because the time lags for settlement of IRS audits can be ten years for large firms (see Gleason and Mills 2002) and because the loss probabilities are difficult to judge, estimating tax cushion provides substantial discretion. After Sarbanes-7 Indirectly related, researchers use book-tax differences as a proxy for discretionary accruals to study pre-tax earnings management. Phillips, Pincus and Rego (2003) find that deferred tax expense is incrementally useful beyond accruals in detecting earnings management. Lev and Nissim (2004) and Hanlon (2005) find that firms with large book-tax differences have lower growth or less persistent earnings. 8 Karen Pincus (Auditing professor, University of Arkansas) related the following anecdote from her participation in training sessions for audit partners serving as the "second partner reviewer." When asked what area of the financial statement these partners had the least comfort, they responded "the tax account" because there was no easy smell test for whether it was correct. 9 Credits include research and development credits, foreign tax credits, possessions company credits (phasing out during our sample period). As an example of an area where a taxpayer might be more or less aggressive, the tax law grants a credit for research related to new products, but not for research conducted after the commercial production of a component (Internal Revenue Code Section 41), and allocating research costs requires judgment.
Oxley takes full effect, requirements for management to improve documentation for tax cushion and for auditors to assess internal controls for risks, including tax risk, should make earnings management more difficult. This presents an opportunity for future work, but does not diminish the generalizability of our study.
The deferred tax asset valuation allowance and the tax effect of unrepatriated foreign earnings are other components of the tax expense that researchers consider to provide earnings management opportunities. SFAS 109 requires that managers record a valuation allowance against deferred tax assets generated by temporary differences or net operating losses, if, based on the weight of available evidence, it is more likely than not that some portion or all of the deferred tax asset will not be realized. (See Visvanathan (1998) (Graham and Tucker 2005) , generally, are sufficiently complex to be difficult to initiate and implement in the last two and one-half months of the year.
Thus, we expect that much tax planning that takes effect in the fourth quarter could be anticipated when managers report third quarter earnings using an estimated annual ETR.
We examine the market response to meeting or beating the forecast as a result of earnings management over both the announcement window and over the subsequent year. We test the following alternative hypothesis:
Hypothesis: The market reward for meeting or beating analysts' consensus forecast is lower if the firm's decrease in tax expense was necessary to beat the forecast than if the firm beat the forecast regardless of any change in tax expense.
Although the tax expense is visible in the quarterly and annual earnings announcements, it is sufficiently complex that analysts and market participants may not be able to identify earnings management (Plumlee 2003) . Whether the market responds differentially to tax-related earnings management is an empirical question. All forms of tax management are not equally obscure. For example, changes in the valuation allowance are often disclosed in footnotes whereas changes in tax cushion are not. Nevertheless, we do not attempt to distinguish between the forms of management because data are not available to identify the specific sources of management. Although we test for differences between groups in the potential to manage taxes, our results address tax expense management in the aggregate.
The market could also discount tax changes because they are transitory. proceeds. Both the pretax life insurance proceeds and the permanent tax benefit of not recording tax expense on these proceeds would be transitory. However, we do not expect such unmanaged transitory changes to be concentrated in firms with earnings management incentives, and we note that both tax expense and pretax earnings contains transitory components.
We focus on the earnings announcement period because Bartov, Givoly and Hayn (2002) find that the market response to the earnings surprise is significantly stronger than the reaction to forecast revisions leading up to the earnings announcement. We also consider returns over the year following the earnings announcement because Bhojraj, Hribar and Picconi (2003) find that the market does appear to differentiate between managed and unmanaged earnings over the longer horizon.
We next describe specifically how we estimate the portion of earnings surprise that is due to tax expense management.
Variable definitions and estimation equations
Following Dhaliwal, Gleason and Mills (2004) we make use of a unique feature of the tax expense component of earnings. APB No. 28 requires firms to use their estimate of the annual ETR in quarterly reports. Unlike the pretax earnings amounts, which represent actual earnings in the quarter, the tax expense is computed using a projection of the annual tax rate, taking into account anticipated pre-tax and tax effects for the remainder of the year. Thus, the annual ETR at the third quarter provides a proxy for the firm's annual ETR before any fourth quarter earnings management. Comprix, Mills and Schmidt (2005) find evidence that suggests firms also decrease ETRs in the second and third quarters to meet quarterly earnings targets, but that the fourth quarter change is the largest. We focus on the fourth quarter change because we believe there is more power for the test and because the third quarter estimate of the annual ETR incorporates the most year-to-date information.
We use the last I/B/E/S consensus forecast before the earnings announcement as our proxy for target earnings (Forecast), following Burgstahler and Eames (2003) . 10 We use the consensus forecast in the primary analyses because the I/B/E/S consensus is frequently publicized in the meet/beat versus miss announcements and is widely available on financial websites. However, the consensus forecast may include stale forecasts. Our results are robust to using last forecast made no later than four trading-days prior to the annual earnings announcement.
The analyst forecast error (AFE) is computed as actual earnings (Actual Earnings)
reported by I/B/E/S less Forecast. We deflate all forecast-error measures using the price at the end of the fiscal year. If actual earnings equal or exceed Forecast, then Beat equals one, zero otherwise.
We partition Beat firms into Beat w/ Tax and Beat w/o Tax to test the effect of tax management on the market reaction to meeting or beating the analysts' forecast. Specifically, we define earnings without tax management (Unmanaged Earnings) as actual pretax earnings multiplied by one minus the annual ETR reported at the third quarter, our proxy for the unmanaged ETR. 11 If Unmanaged Earnings meets or beats the analyst consensus forecast, then 10 Baber and Kang (2002) show that rounding induced by I/B/E/S split adjustments can result in misclassifying whether a firm just beats or just misses the consensus analysts' forecasts. See also Payne and Thomas (2003) . Our data come from the non-split-adjusted file. We also find that our results are robust to requiring at least five analysts and to eliminating the top and bottom deciles for the standard deviation of analyst forecasts. This reduces the potential influence of extremely difficult or easy to forecast firms. We do not assume that all the change in the ETR from the third to the fourth quarter is earnings management. Rather, we suggest that if using a tax decrease to meet or beat earnings targets matters to market participants, the return for Beat w/ Tax firms will be less than for firms that meet or beat the target without managing taxes. Nevertheless, we recognize that some aspects of tax expense can be inherently hard to estimate, resulting in more changes in the fourth quarter. For example, net operating losses and foreign income introduce uncertainty concerning the amount of valuation allowance and the effect of blended foreign tax rates. This is more problematic for our results if differences exist between our partitions.
Thus, we test whether net operating losses and foreign income and foreign tax, research and development expenditures, goodwill and special items differ across our partitions.
Unfortunately, many of these detailed disclosures are only available on an annual basis. These same factors that introduce uncertainty also introduce discretion and thus opportunities for earnings management. For this reason we prefer to include the controls as supplemental tests.
Because our tests are aimed at furthering our understanding of earnings management via tax expense, we describe earnings calculated using the third quarter ETR more simply as that we approximate the I/B/E/S earnings definition because we construct net earnings using pretax income and effective tax rates, excluding discontinued operations and extraordinary items. Our results are robust to excluding "unmanaged earnings." However, pretax earnings likely include some earnings management such as opportunistically recorded abnormal accruals. To address this, we include abnormal total accruals (Ab_Accrual) in our regressions.
Managers will only use tax expense to achieve targets if their incentives are aligned with after-tax income. Phillips (2003) finds that firms whose CEOs' bonuses are based on after-tax earnings report lower effective tax rates than do firms that base bonuses on pretax earnings.
Because our sample is later than his, we expect that after-tax bonus incentives are more widespread. 12 In addition, compensation plans are increasingly stock-based, and thus implicitly after-tax. Core, Guay, and Verrecchia (2003) show that the average annual salary and bonus is only 30 percent of total CEO pay. Further, they find that the change in value of CEO equity holdings is more than eight times total CEO pay. This is consistent with after-tax earnings playing an important role in CEO motivation. Thus, although managers may prefer to manage pre-tax earnings first, they are still generally motivated to use tax expense if needed. Consistent with Dhaliwal, Gleason and Mills' (2004) characterization, tax expense often represents the last chance to manage earnings.
Several effects work against finding evidence consistent with our hypotheses. First, our measure of unmanaged earnings likely includes some pre-tax earnings management. We control for this by including a measure of abnormal accruals in robustness tests, discussed below.
Second, the third quarter ETR could already incorporate anticipated tax management for year-end. We address this concern by conducting supplemental tests using a subsample of 17,862 firms that have no ETR decrease between quarters two and three. Our results are robust firms with special items, discontinued operations or extraordinary items. 12 Phillips ' (2003) sample period from the early-to-mid 1990s was prior to tax departments being viewed as profit centers. For example, The Joint Committee on Taxation referred to Enron's tax department as a profit center in its over both the announcement period and following year for the full sample and over the one-year return for the within-five-cents sample.
Third, the change in the fourth quarter effective tax rate could be due to tax planning or revision of estimate that is not earnings management. We use tax return data in untabulated supplemental tests to control for the net amount of estimated tax overpayment as a proxy for unanticipated or late-year tax planning, and our results are unchanged. This result suggests either that late-year ETR changes are unrelated to tax planning or that the stock market reacts unfavorably to ETR changes that appear to be earnings management even in the presence of higher tax refunds. Our results are also robust to excluding the top and bottom deciles either of the third quarter ETR or of the change in the ETR from the third to the fourth quarter, to control for extreme levels or changes where earnings management could be less feasible or a secondorder effect.
Fourth, the change in the fourth quarter effective tax rate could be mechanical due to unexpected changes in pretax income adding more or fewer dollars of tax at the statutory rate to the overall effective tax rate. 13 We develop an estimate of this 'induced tax change' in Dhaliwal Gleason and Mills (2003) and refer readers there for a full discussion. Our results are robust to redefining our measures of tax management to exclude the induced effect.
Finally, managers could have attempted to guide analysts' forecasts downward.
Conference calls analyzed by Tasker (1998) show that 20% of analyst questions are focused on earnings guidance and include questions such as "What tax rate should we be using for fiscal announcement. All of these effects would work against detecting a difference in the market's response to meeting or beating the forecast using tax management.
We compute cumulative size-adjusted returns as the return for the firm over the period less the return over the same period for the portfolio of firms in the same CRSP size decile. We accumulate returns around the earnings announcement window (trading day -2 to day +2) and for the twelve-month period following the annual earnings announcement.
14 We estimate three regressions to test the relation between cumulative size-adjusted returns and analyst forecast errors. The first regression includes the analyst forecast error computed using actual earnings (AFE). This regression provides a baseline for comparison with prior research.
Model A:
We expect the coefficient on the analyst forecast error in Model A to be positive, consistent with prior studies. We include three control variables related to returns in other studies (e.g. Fama and French 1992 , Jegadeesh and Titman 1993 , Gleason and Lee 2003 , the book to market ratio (BM), the natural log of total assets (Size) and cumulative size-adjusted returns for the six-months preceding the earnings announcement (Momentum).
robust to omitting firms with special items, extraordinary items or discontinued operations amounts, so we conclude that write-offs do not affect our conclusions. 14 Balsam, Bartov and Marquardt (2002) 
The intercept for firms that miss the target is β 0 . We expect the coefficient on Beat w/o Tax to be positive if the market places a premium on meeting or beating the forecast. We also expect the coefficient on Beat w/ Tax to be positive, consistent with a positive market reaction to beating the forecast, regardless of the means. Consistent with Bartov, Givoly and Hayn (2003) , the coefficient on Beat w/ Tax will be less than the coefficient on Beat w/o Tax if the market differentiates between firms that decreased tax expense to meet or beat the forecast and firms that beat the forecast regardless of the change in tax expense.
The slope coefficient on the forecast error (AFE) captures the market response to the earnings surprise for firms that missed the forecast. We expect the coefficient to be positive, consistent with positive returns accruing to positive surprises and negative returns accruing to negative surprises. Our regressions use pooled cross-sectional data over a 13 year period. To deal with the sample dependence problem, we report Huber-White robust standard errors (Rogers 1993 , generalizing White 1980 . The maximum-likelihood estimation procedure assumes and estimates a common component of the variance and co-variance matrix for all observations from the same firm and the standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (StataCorp (1999, 257) ). Because we use this correction, we do not separately control for industry effects.
Sample selection and descriptive statistics
We use returns data from CRSP, Compustat annual and quarterly financial statement data and I/B/E/S analyst forecast data for fiscal years from 1987 to 2002. We require firms to have one year of returns following the earnings announcement, so our sample of fiscal-year 2002 firms is constrained. 15 The sample of matched observations is 60,061 firm-years that have data for pretax income and tax expense on an annual and quarterly basis. We limit our sample to We use our measure of "unmanaged earnings" to decompose the forecast error into the tax-managed and unmanaged component. The unmanaged forecast error (Unscaled UnmanAFE), defined as the difference between earnings absent tax management (Unmanaged Earnings) and the consensus forecast, is about two cents per share on average. Thus, the average firm beats the forecast without managing taxes. The tax-expense-managed forecast error, defined as the difference between Actual Earnings and Unmanaged Earnings is -3.7 cents per share (Unscaled ManAFE). In supplemental tests, we consider a narrower sample of firms whose total and unmanaged forecast errors are within five cents of the target. In untabulated descriptive tests we find that the mean managed forecast error for these firms close to the target is 0.9 (median 1.1) cents per share, indicating that firms manage earnings up on average near the target. We also report forecast errors scaled by the price at the end of the fiscal year. We used the scaled forecast errors in the regressions.
The average change in ETRs (ETR Change) from the third to the fourth quarter is an increase of 0.1%. See Dhaliwal, Gleason, and Mills (2004) and Comprix, Mills, and Schmidt (2005) for additional descriptive detail on the change in ETRs. On average firms earn positive cumulative size-adjusted returns around the earnings announcement (and, in untabulated tests, during the next four months firms earn an average return of 3.1 percent). This is consistent with the average firm having a positive earnings surprise. Over the 12 months following the earnings announcement, the average firm has positive cumulative size-adjusted returns (3.5%). Table 2 This is consistent with insignificant differences in pre-tax earnings management across groups.
For firms close to the target we find little evidence of significant differences in tax management opportunities. Thus, we conclude that our results are unlikely to be solely due to differences in opportunities to manage income tax expense.
Results
In Table 4 , we present the results of pooled cross-sectional regressions. We regress a 40% reduction in the reward for beating the forecast. We find consistent results in the subsample of firms with total and unmanaged earnings within five cents of the consensus forecast. For these firms the discount is more than 25% and statistically significant at p<0.05 based on an (untabulated) F test.
Results for Model B also show that the forecast error is positively related to abnormal returns only in the five-cent subsample. The declining importance of the forecast error in predicting returns compared to Panel A suggests that whether and how firms beat the forecast is more closely related to abnormal returns than the amount of the surprise. In untabulated sensitivity tests, we investigate whether partitioning the forecast error into the portion due to tax rate change (ManAFE) and "unmanaged earnings" (UnmanAFE) is meaningful, but find that partitioning the forecast error into managed and unmanaged components provides limited insight beyond the simpler model in Table 4 .
In Model C, we include abnormal total accruals ( In summary, the market reward to firms that beat earnings regardless of the change in tax expense appears to be incomplete in the short run and require longer to be fully priced. The market also discounts the announcement period reward to beating the forecast only after decreasing tax expense for both the full and the within-five-cents samples. However, for firms close to the target, the return over the following year for beating the forecast only after decreasing tax expense is not different from the return for missing the forecast. This suggests that the market is more skeptical of firms that beat the forecast by decreasing tax expense and is consistent with the market viewing these changes as earnings management.
Finer Partitions for Direction of Earnings Management
An alternative explanation for our results is that the market places a lower value on ETR decreases generally. To examine this possibility, we further partition the various combinations of forecast errors, managed and unmanaged earnings.
We form six groups based on all possible combinations using the sign of the total forecast error (AFE) and the unmanaged (UnmanAFE) and managed (ManAFE) components of the forecast error (three forecast error measures times two directions). This partitioning splits firms identified as Beat w/o Tax into 1) firms that meet or beat the forecast regardless of changes in tax expense, and decreased tax expense, which we call 'beat decreased tax' (BDT) or 2) firms that meet or beat the forecast regardless of changes in tax expense, and increased tax expense (BIT).
We also partition the Missed firms into 1) firms that missed and decreased tax expense (MDT),
2) firms that missed and increased tax expense (MIT) or 3) firms that missed because of the increase in tax expense ('manage to miss' MTM). The sixth group is our prior category of firms that only beat the forecast because they decreased tax expense (Beat w/ Tax, or BWT).
In table 5 MIT, and MTM). In Table 6 we investigate whether using a six-way partition elucidates further our results from Table 4 .
For each category, we include both intercept terms and interaction terms with the forecast error. Although complex, this model allows us to consider whether the market reaction differs according to how the tax expense change affected beating or missing the forecast.
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The intercept results in Table 6 are consistent with Table 4 . The announcement returns are generally consistent with the market reacting more favorably to firms that meet or beat the forecast without earnings management, whether they decreased (BDT) or increased (BIT) tax expense. The difference between Beat w/ Tax and both BDT and BIT are significant for the full sample. For the five-cent sample, the difference between Beat w/ Tax and BDT is only significant over the full year. This is consistent with the market requiring a longer time period to identify and fully price the difference in the effect of the tax management.
Although the market does not reward managing to beat (Beat w/ Tax is not significantly different from zero in most samples and time periods), the market punishes missing the forecast relative to managing to beat. For the five-cent sample, the differences are less pronounced.
Overall, the return to a tax rate decrease is only smaller than other earnings changes when the decrease permits the firm to meet or beat the forecast. This result indicates that the smaller return is due to the effect of the decrease on meeting or beating the forecast, rather than the direction. The finer partitions complicate the analysis but lead to the same conclusion: meeting or beating the forecast through tax expense management receives positive market rewards, but less than the reward for beating the forecast without tax expense management.
Conclusions
This study expands research by Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn (2002) and Bhojraj, Hribar, and Picconi (2003) concerning the market's reaction to earnings management and firms that meet or beat analysts' forecasts to provide specific evidence about the market reaction to beating the forecast via tax expense management. We use changes in effective tax rates from the third to the fourth quarter to estimate managed earnings, following and extending Dhaliwal Gleason and Mills (2004) .
We find a higher market reaction to the earnings announcements of firms that meet or beat the forecast without management of tax expense relative to firms that meet or beat the forecast only after managing tax expense. Consistent with Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn (2002) the abnormal return to beating the forecast with earnings management is significantly greater than the return to missing the forecast. The discount for managing taxes to beat the target is approximately 40 percent for the full sample. The discounting continues over the year following the earnings announcement. Thus, the market appears to distinguish between the sources of the earnings surprise. The positive, but lower return for beating the target via managing earnings is consistent with an incentive for managers to manage earnings upward.
When we limit the sample to firms within five cents of the target, we find similar results.
Beating the target without management is rewarded about 25 percent more than beating the target with management, but both are better than missing the target. We confirm that the discount for firms beating the target by decreasing tax expense is not simply a discounting of tax decreases in general.
Our research setting using quarterly effective tax rates to measure earnings management complements and extends related research using accruals versus cash flows. Researchers often use the magnitude of accruals (or discretionary accruals) to partition samples into firms that are more likely to be earnings managers versus firms that are less likely to be earnings managers, but seldom attempt to measure the amount of managed earnings in these settings. Our results are robust to including the level of abnormal accruals. We believe that our test of a specific account provides additional evidence that the market distinguishes between, but reacts incompletely to, managed and unmanaged earnings. Unscaled UnmanAFE = unmanaged income {pretax income * (1-EtrQ3) * I/B/E/S split factor / common shares to compute basic EPS} minus the last I/B/E/S consensus forecast. Unscaled ManAFE = Unmanaged income {pretax income * (1-EtrQ3) * I/B/E/S split factor / common shares to compute basic EPS} -Actual Income, as reported by I/B/E/S. AFE = AFE deflated by market price at the end of the fiscal year. UnmanAFE = Unscaled UnmanAFE deflated by market price at the end of the fiscal year. ManAFE = ManAFE deflated by market price at the end of the fiscal year. ETR Change = the fourth quarter ETR (EtrQ4) less the third quarter ETR (EtrQ3), where the ETR is defined as accumulated (through quarters four or three) year-to-date tax expense divided by accumulated pretax income. BM = common shareholders equity / market value of common stock at the end of the fiscal year. Size = the natural log of total assets at the end of the fiscal year. Momentum = the cumulative size-adjusted returns for the six months prior to the earnings announcement, ending on day -3. Ab_Accrual = the residual from the regression of total accruals on the change in revenue and lagged return on assets, following Kothari et al. (2004) . Announcement CAR = The cumulative return for the firm for the five trading-day window around the earnings announcement (day -2 to day +2) minus the cumulative return for an equal-weighted portfolio of firms in the same CRSP size decile. One-Year CAR is the size portfolio adjusted return accumulated from day +2 to day +252. ***, **, * two-tailed p-value less than 0.001, 0.01, 0.05 respectively for t-statistic. † † †, † †, † F-test indicates that the coefficient on Beat w/o Tax is larger than Beat w/ Tax at p-value less than 0.01, 0.05, 0.10. The t-statistics are calculated using Huber-White standard errors. An econometric adjustment using a cluster option by firm produces correct standard errors even if the observations are correlated and heteroskedastic (see StataCorp (1999, 257) ). a See Table 1 for variable definitions   39   TABLE 5 Description of management categories Partition definitions are as follows: Beat w/Tax (BWT) firms only beat the forecast because they decreased tax expense. We partitioned firms previously identified as Beat w/o Tax into 1) firms that meet or beat the forecast regardless of changes in tax expense, and decreased tax expense, which we call 'beat decreased tax' (BDT) or 2) firms that meet or beat the forecast regardless of changes in tax expense, and increased tax expense (BIT). We also partition the Missed firms into 1) firms that missed and decreased tax expense (MDT), 2) firms that missed and increased tax expense (MIT) or 3) firms that missed because of the increase in tax expense ('manage to miss' MTM). StataCorp (1999, 257) ). a See Tables 1 and 5 for variable definitions. 
